REVOLUTIONARY FLEXIBILITY OR REFORMIST COMPROMISE? A CRITIQUE OF PUDEMO´S 1ST DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL´S ELECTORAL TURN
Comrade Maxwell Dlamini’s recent calls for the participation of PUDEMO and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) in Eswatini’s Tinkhundla electoral system raise important questions about revolutionary strategy in a context dominated by absolute monarchy.
While his arguments for strategic flexibility and tactical compromise might appear pragmatic and rooted in political realism, they risk misinterpreting the very nature of the struggle for liberation. At its core, the question that Maxwell poses is whether revolutionaries can, or should, engage with a system that fundamentally undermines revolutionary progress.
His rhetoric positions electoral participation as a form of “revolutionary flexibility” and an essential part of the struggle, yet it fails to account for the structural realities of the country´s political system. Maxwell has argued that refusing to engage in Tinkhundla elections isolates revolutionaries from the people and that participation could allow revolutionaries to amplify their message within state institutions.
This position, however, is not isolated—PUDEMO President Mlungisi Makhanya has similarly encouraged participation in elections, calling for revolutionaries to defend what he termed “revolutionary seats.” These statements signal a strategic shift within PUDEMO, particularly from two senior leaders—one being the head of the organization’s communication and information structures (Maxwell) and the other being its political leader (Mlungisi).
The President has served in the YL (SWAYOCO) National Executive Committee (NEC) and as National Commissar, Secreatry General and subsequently President. The 1st DSG has served as the Secratry General of the YL. This critique acknowledges the contributions of these leaders, who have held key positions in both PUDEMO and SWAYOCO.
However, it also questions whether this electoral turn represents a principled Marxist-Leninist strategy or a deviation that risks legitimizing the very system PUDEMO seeks to dismantle. This critique also acknowledges that SWAYOCO resolved to use Marxism-Leninism as a tool of analysis. It remains unclear whether PUDEMO did the same at the recent congress in Mbongozi, South Africa.
Understanding the Swazi State: A Monarchy Built to Preserve Capitalist-Feudal Interests
Maxwell Dlamini’s critique of revolutionary purism begins with the notion that the rigid refusal to engage with Tinkhundla institutions isolates the movement from the masses, ultimately hindering the struggle. His argument suggests that “revolutionary purism” blinds comrades to opportunities for engagement.
This, he argues, is a failure to understand the importance of strategic and tactical flexibility. However, this position overlooks the fundamental nature of the Swazi state—a system designed to perpetuate feudal-monarchial rule in conjunction with capitalist exploitation. From a Marxist-Leninist perspective, it is crucial to recognize that the Swazi monarchy is not a passive or neutral political system but an active force of oppression. The Tinkhundla system, by design, is a mechanism for securing the dominance of the monarchy and capitalist elites.
It is not a site for neutral political discourse; rather, it is a hegemonic institution crafted to prevent the emergence of any substantive challenge to the monarchy’s absolute control. The King appoints the Prime Minister, key ministers, and a majority of the Senate, and retains ultimate power over the legislature and executive, ensuring that no political figure or group can truly challenge the royal status quo. Lenin’s analysis of the state as an instrument of class rule is invaluable here.
The Swazi state is a tool of the monarchy, protecting its interests against the working class, the peasantry, and the masses. No amount of electoral participation can change this structural reality; engaging with such a system is akin to offering legitimacy to a state apparatus that is built to suppress the very forces that need to be overthrown.
It is not an arena in which revolutionaries can operate freely or successfully—it is one designed to trap them in a system of compromise and co-optation. Maxwell’s error lies in his failure to see this fundamental contradiction. The masses do not need to elect a “better leader” within the Tinkhundla system; they need to overthrow the system itself.
The issue, then, is not one of ideological purity or rigid refusal to engage; rather, it is the refusal to participate in a counter-revolutionary system that has been engineered to preserve the monarchy.
The Myth of “Tactical Compromise” in a Reactionary System
Maxwell argues that revolutionaries must be flexible, and that “not all compromises are betrayals”. He suggests that engaging with the Tinkhundla system—by running for positions such as Bucopho or Indvuna Yekhundla—is a necessary tactical compromise, allowing revolutionaries to broaden their support base and expand their influence.
According to this logic, revolutionaries must work within the system to win over the masses and gain legitimacy. While this might appear as a realistic political maneuver, it is, in fact, a dangerous delusion rooted in electoralism, which undermines the revolutionary struggle. Marxist-Leninists view electoralism within a dictatorship not as a tool for revolution, but as a method of co-optation.
Lenin himself was clear on this point: compromise with reactionary forces can only ever be tactical when it advances the revolutionary goal of overthrowing the system. In the case of the Swazi monarchy, any engagement in Tinkhundla elections, without the goal of dismantling the system entirely, serves only to legitimize that very system.
It strengthens the monarchy’s hold on power by allowing revolutionaries to be absorbed into its institutional framework. The argument for tactical compromise here is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Swazi state. The Tinkhundla system is not a neutral entity that can be “reformed” through the participation of well-meaning activists; it is a tool of the monarchy designed to divide, control, and defuse opposition. Any attempt to operate within this system without directly challenging it is doomed to either fail in creating substantive change or result in the revolutionary forces being absorbed into the existing structures of oppression.
Maxwell’s assertion that electoral participation could somehow amplify the voices of revolutionaries within the Tinkhundla system ignores the reality of political suppression in Eswatini. The systemic violence, censorship, and surveillance within the Tinkhundla system make it impossible for revolutionaries to exert meaningful influence through electoral participation.
Engaging in this process without a clear revolutionary agenda only offers false hope and ultimately undermines the mass struggle needed to bring about real change. Perhaps whilst there exists a consensus that the struggle has and shall be waged in many fronts with parliament being a site of struggle, there lies a danger with Maxwell´s postulation.
The danger of announcing a tactic prematurely—such as the intention to run candidates in the Tinkhundla system—lies in the potential for misleading the masses about the true nature of the struggle. When a tactic is announced before it has been fully assessed and planned for, it risks creating false expectations and undermining the revolutionary discipline needed to confront the monarchy. By positioning electoral participation as a primary form of engagement, the leadership might divert the movement’s energies from building mass-based, direct action toward parliamentary maneuvering that ultimately proves futile.
This premature announcement of a tactic can also disorient the rank-and-file and reduce their capacity for collective revolutionary action. Revolutionaries must always maintain strategic clarity—and that means making sure that tactics, such as electoral participation, are always subordinated to the overarching strategy of revolution. If these tactics are prematurely announced, they risk becoming an end in themselves, rather than a means toward the ultimate goal of overthrowing the monarchy.
Accepted, tactics must be fluid and responsive to changing conditions. However publicly committing to a tactic before its feasibility and strategic value have been fully understood is dangerous because it locks the movement into a course of action that might divert from revolutionary principles. Therefore, announcing the tactic of running in elections prematurely is a potentially disastrous decision. Even if we were to participate, electoral participation must always be seen as a secondary tactic, subjugated to the overarching revolutionary strategy of overthrowing the monarchy.
To allow it to become the central focus of the struggle is to risk co-optation, dilution of the revolutionary consciousness, and a failure to address the true nature of the state.
The Illusion of Empowerment: Revolutionary Participation in the Tinkhundla System
Maxwell’s rhetorical questions about what is wrong with a community-based activist running for parliament or a local leadership position suggest that personal integrity, leadership, and local support are enough to justify participation in the electoral process.
He asks, “What is wrong with the people of Sithobelweni nominating, voting for, and supporting a leader who has diligently served his community?” The answer, from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, is that the problem is not with individual activists—it is with the structural nature of the Tinkhundla system itself. No messiah shall come to free our people. The idea that community leaders can rise within the Tinkhundla system and propagate change within the monarchy is a reformist illusion.
As Lenin emphasized, a revolution cannot succeed by relying on “better” individuals within an oppressive state; it must mobilize the masses to destroy the system itself. No matter how well-intentioned an individual may be, once they enter the Tinkhundla system, they are entrenched in a system designed to neutralize their efforts.
The real issue is not about finding “better leaders” within the system but about organizing the masses to overthrow the monarchy altogether. The idea that voting for a revolutionary within Tinkhundla can change anything is ultimately a dangerous form of electoralism, which dilutes the revolutionary consciousness needed to mobilize the masses.
If PUDEMO’s leadership engages in the Tinkhundla system, they will inevitably be pulled into a compromise with the monarchy, rather than challenging it. The monarchy’s power is not dependent on bad leaders in parliament; it is entrenched in the entire political system. Engagement in the electoral process can only strengthen the monarchy and prolong the suffering of the Swazi people. A true liberation will be an act of the people.
Revolutionary Strategy: Mass Mobilization, Not Parliamentary Maneuvering
Lenin’s approach to revolution was always centered on mobilizing the masses for direct action. In the face of a dictatorship, revolutionaries must seek to organize the working class, the peasants, and the oppressed masses into a unified revolutionary force capable of overthrowing the state. Electoral participation in such a system is not a revolutionary path forward, but a diversion that risks neutralizing revolutionary energy and delaying the necessary confrontation with the monarchy.
The call for “revolutionary flexibility” through engagement in Tinkhundla elections ultimately leads to a concession to the logic of parliamentary reformism. While it is true that revolutionaries must always be flexible in their tactics, this flexibility must be carefully understood: it must always serve the broader goal of overthrowing the state and building a new, more just society. There is nothing revolutionary about Tinkundla parliamentary seats. Any participation in elections must be understood as operating within a dictatorship’s system of control, not as a revolutionary breakthrough. The leadership of the movement must not muddy the message by creating reformist illusions.