REVOLUTIONARY REALISM: A TACTICAL CASE FOR ENGAGING TINKHUNDLA ELECTIONS
Comrade Thembelihle Starky Dlamini’s critique of my call for the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) to participate in Swaziland’s Tinkhundla elections reflects a well-intentioned but overly rigid interpretation of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary strategy and tactics.
His article, Revolutionary Flexibility or Reformist Compromise? Frames my position as a dangerous flirtation with reformism, risking the co-optation of our revolutionary struggle into the monarchy’s oppressive framework. While I respect his commitment to revolutionary purity, his analysis mischaracterizes tactical engagement as capitulation and overlooks the dialectical necessity of contesting all available fronts—including the Tinkhundla system—to advance our ultimate goal: the complete dismantling of the monarchy and the establishment of a constitutional multiparty democracy. This rejoinder reaffirms that participation is not an endorsement of Tinkhundla but a revolutionary weapon to expose, disrupt, and ultimately overthrow it.
The Swazi State: A Reactionary Fortress, Yet a Contested Terrain
Comrade Thembelihle correctly identifies the Swazi monarchy as a reactionary force, with the Tinkhundla system designed to entrench feudal-monarchical rule and capitalist exploitation. He invokes Lenin’s analysis of the state as an instrument of class oppression, arguing that engaging with such a system inherently legitimizes it.
However, this reading flattens Lenin’s dialectical approach. In Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin criticized ultra-leftists who rejected parliamentary participation under reactionary regimes, insisting that revolutionaries must “take advantage of every crack in the enemy’s system” to reach the masses and expose its contradictions.
The Tinkhundla system, though undemocratic, is not an impregnable monolith but a terrain where the monarchy’s hegemony can be challenged. Refusing to engage cedes this space to royal loyalists, isolating us from the rural masses—where our message has historically struggled to penetrate—and leaving them without a revolutionary alternative.
A false binary is created between mass mobilization and parliamentary participation, as though one negates the other. This is ultra-leftist purism, which Lenin strongly critiqued in Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Lenin insisted that revolutionaries must be flexible and pragmatic, engaging in multiple sites of struggle simultaneously.
In Swaziland , where rural communities remain politically isolated, electoral engagement provides a direct channel to mobilize, agitate, and politicize the masses. The ban on political parties, while a structural limitation, does not preclude participation. As I noted in my original proposal, individual members of political parties are not barred from contesting elections as independents.
Encouraging MDM activists to run for positions such as Bucopho, Indvuna Yenkhundla, or Members of Parliament is a tactical maneuver to infiltrate the system, not to reform it. These “revolutionary seats,” become platforms to amplify pro-democracy demands, expose the monarchy’s failures, and politicize the masses. Comrade Thembelihle’s claim that this legitimizes the system oversimplifies the intent: participation is a means to subvert, not sustain, Tinkhundla rule.
Targeting the Weakest Link: Why Parliament, Bucopho, Indvuna, and Municipalities Are Low-Hanging Fruits for Progressives
In Swaziland ’s autocracy, parliament, bucopho, indvuna, and municipality positions are the regime’s weakest and most vulnerable institutions. Unlike the executive and judiciary, which are entirely controlled by King Mswati, these structures are the only ones directly elected by the people.
This presents a unique opportunity for progressives to infiltrate, disrupt, and radicalize the political landscape. Mswati appoints only 1/6 of Parliament, limiting his direct influence. If a critical mass of progressives occupies these positions, it could expose contradictions, force a constitutional crisis, and create a revolutionary moment.
The monarchy’s reluctance to act on parliamentary resolutions would delegitimize the system, making these institutions the ideal battleground for attacking the regime.
Tactical Compromise as Revolutionary Praxis
Comrade Thembelihle’s critique hinges on the notion that electoral participation within a dictatorship equates to electoralism—a reformist trap that co-opts revolutionaries. He asserts that the Tinkhundla system’s violence, censorship, and surveillance render meaningful influence impossible. Yet, Marxist-Leninist history demonstrates otherwise. The Bolsheviks participated in the Tsarist Duma, a body far more repressive than Tinkhundla, not to reform it but to use its platform for agitation and organization.
These precedents underscore that tactical compromise is not betrayal when subordinated to the revolutionary goal of overthrowing the system. My proposal does not envision participation as the sole path to liberation. As I emphasized, “Participation alone will not make a revolutionary breakthrough.” Rather, it expands the theater of struggle—taking it “into the doorstep of the enemy”—and complements mass mobilization, international solidarity, and underground work.
By contesting elections, we force the monarchy to reveal its repressive nature through disqualifications, vote rigging, or suppression, radicalizing even those with illusions about the system. Far from offering false hope, this tactic exposes the illegitimacy of Tinkhundla rule, it amplifies demands, mobilizes the masses, exposes contradictions, and weakens the state from within.
Comrade Thembelihle’s concern about premature announcement of this tactic is a valid operational critique, but it does not negate the strategy’s merit. Whether we pursue this overtly or covertly is a matter of modalities, to be informed by material conditions and debated within the movement. I argue for overt participation to “inspire, mobilize, and agitate the Swazis” to confront the regime head-on, fostering revolutionary consciousness rather than shrouding our intent in secrecy, which risks alienating the masses we aim to lead.
Beyond the Myth of Pure Insurrectionism
Comrade Thembelihle’s rejection of electoral engagement veers toward an ultra-leftist fantasy of “pure insurrectionism,” assuming revolution emerges spontaneously from mass mobilization alone. Marxism-Leninism teaches that revolutions require preparation, organization, and engagement with the masses where they are—not where we wish them to be.
In Swaziland, where political parties operate on shoestring budgets, lack offices, and struggle to support exiles and prisoners, participation offers practical benefits. Imagine 100 Bucopho, out of 387, each contributing E2, 000 monthly from their salaries—E2.4 million annually to fund mass mobilization, underground work, international work, exiles, prisoners, and campaigns.
This is not reformist co-optation but the strategic use of taxpayers’ money to bankroll the revolution, enhancing our organizational capacity and outreach, particularly in rural areas. Moreover, elected revolutionaries can mobilize communities directly. A Bucopho bringing 10 people to a protest against electricity tariff hikes, multiplied across 100 communities, yields 1,000 protesters—a tangible escalation of mass action.
This synergy between parliamentary presence and grassroots resistance refutes Comrade Thembelihle’s false dichotomy between electoral participation and mass mobilization. Both are mutually reinforcing fronts in a multi-pronged struggle.
International Solidarity and Institutional Disruption
Participation extends beyond domestic gains. Tinkhundla loyalists currently dominate regional and global parliamentary forums like the Pan African Parliament, SADC Parliamentary Forum, and International Parliamentary Union, entrenching the monarchy’s reactionary agenda. By electing MDM-aligned MPs, we can challenge this narrative, build alliances with progressive governments, and isolate the regime internationally. Highlighting Swaziland’s democratic deficiencies in these spaces aligns with our goal of dismantling Tinkhundla, leveraging legal platforms to amplify the illegal underground work that Comrade Thembelihle rightly champions.
Within the system, revolutionaries can disrupt proceedings, introduce radical proposals, and use state resources to defend activists from repression. This “dual power” strategy—operating inside and outside Tinkhundla—weakens the monarchy while strengthening our movement, a tactic rooted in Leninist pragmatism rather than reformist illusion. The EFF in South Africa provides a perfect example of using parliamentary route to stretch parliament and introduce radical approach and ideas.
Revolutionary Flexibility, Not Reformist Illusion
Comrade Thembelihle’s assertion that participation entrenches “better leaders” within a flawed system misreads my intent. I am not seeking messianic figures to save Swaziland but organized revolutionaries to destabilize Tinkhundla from all fronts. His critique of my rhetorical question—“What is wrong with the people of Sithobelweni nominating… a leader who has diligently served his community?”—misses the point.
The issue is not individual integrity but collective strategy: using community trust to infiltrate and subvert the system. This is not about electing saviors but empowering the masses to see the monarchy’s fragility through their own participation in the struggle. I reject the label of reformism. Participation does not mean acceptance—it is a calculated tactic to “use legal spaces to advance revolutionary objectives.” Comrade Thembelihle’s fear that we will be “pulled into compromise” assumes a static struggle, ignoring our ability to maintain revolutionary discipline. The monarchy’s power is entrenched, yes, but abstention only prolongs its dominance by leaving the masses without a visible alternative. As Lenin argued, revolutionaries must meet the people where they are, not retreat into ideological silos.
Conclusion: A Multi-Front Struggle for Liberation
Revolutionaries must be strategic and dynamic, not rigidly dogmatic. Electoral participation in Tinkhundla is not about reformism—it is about infiltrating, exposing, and radicalizing. The ultimate objective remains the overthrow of the Tinkhundla and the establishment of a constitutional multiparty democracy. Tactical engagement is not surrender; it is revolutionary warfare fought on multiple fronts.
To reject this outright is to abandon valuable tools that can accelerate the struggle and expand the revolutionary movement’s reach into areas where it has struggled to organize effectively. We must embrace revolutionary flexibility, using all available means to bring about the final defeat of the monarchy. Comrade Thembelihle’s critique reflects a principled stand against co-optation, but it risks paralyzing the movement with dogmatic absenteeism.
My call for participation in Tinkhundla elections is neither a detour into parliamentary reformism nor a betrayal of Marxist-Leninist ideals. It is a tactical escalation of our struggle—combining electoral agitation, mass mobilization, international solidarity, and underground resistance—to make Swaziland ungovernable and hasten the monarchy’s downfall. Revolution is not a single act but a process, requiring flexibility, pragmatism, and relentless engagement with every crack in the enemy’s armor. Let us contest all spaces, comrades, and turn Tinkhundla into the monarchy’s own graveyard.
Disclaimer: Kindly note that Maxwell Dlamini requested that the article not be published due to potential backlash from his organization. However, as he had already submitted the article last night, and in consideration of public interest and the expectations we had created, we have decided to proceed with publication.